News

www.DELFI.lt 16 January 2012 m. If the Polish newspaper Rzeczpospolita published an article urging the restoration of the Rzeczpospolita, I would say it is worth considering, notwithstanding how this idea would trigger resentment within the wide ranks of polonophobes. If they published an article reproaching Lithuania for its lack of love for Russia, that I would also find understandable, for there is evidently a spirit of nearly Brezhnev-style kissing between Warsaw and Moscow. Instead Rzeczpospolita published an article stating that Lithuania is increasingly leaning towards Russia.

“Under the presidencies of Valdas Adamkus and Lech Kaczyński, both countries were seen as the toughest fighters in relations with Russia. Now, under the leadership of Dalia Grybauskaitė who received an education in Leningrad, the relations between Lithuania and Russia are no longer a cold war of words, but rather a chilly peace”, Jerzy Haszczynski, the author of the article, argues. “There are many signs that Vilnius would prefer an even warmer peace” (See “Młodszy brat, starszy brat i wielki brat”).

Haszczynski does not even bother to explain to his readers what specifically the signs of these attempts to secure a warmer peace are. Supposedly, the key argument is Grybauskaite’s studies in Leningrad. Such a “solid” argument.

How exactly does the policy of President Dalia Grybauskaite’s and the government of PM Andrius Kubilius seem pro-Russian to Mr Haszczynski? Perhaps his conclusion is based on Lithuania’s pursuit of energy independence from Russia? Or perhaps Ms Grybauskaite too strongly urged NATO to more quickly draft plans for the defence of the Baltic countries? The accusations concerning a warmer peace with Russia look even more bizarre as they come from Russia’s great friend, Donald Tusk’s Poland. Mr Haszczynski is right that Lithuania’s and Poland’s stance on Russia looked toughest in the EU. But he is misleading his readers by picturing a supposedly changed Lithuanian, rather than Polish, position.

As far as warmer peace with Russia is concerned, we should at least acknowledge that the provider of heat is Poland, not Lithuania. Warsaw has recently been busy trying hard to include Russia in the so-called Weimar triangle and extend it to a quadrangle. This is a much more realistic feature of warmer peace than the studies of Lithuanian politicians in Moscow or Leningrad during Soviet times. As if that were not enough, Poland, as a larger EU country, is going all out to secure visa-free travel for the Kaliningrad Oblast. It is Poland’s policy of the Weimar quadrangle and progress on visa-free travel for the Kaliningrad Oblast that demonstrate, in the words of Tomas Misiūnas, ‘a warmer relationship with Russia’.

At the beginning of his 2008 visit to Moscow, Polish Foreign Affairs Minister Radosław Sikorski declared that there would be consultations with Moscow regarding the US anti-missile shield. Soon after, plans to base the anti-missile shield in Poland, vehemently opposed by Moscow, were buried.

On 27–29 August 2009, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov paid a visit to the annual meeting of Polish ambassadors. A year after the Russian aggression against Georgia, the EU diplomatic elite found no better guest of honour than the foreign minister of the aggressor.

In Autumn 2010 Mr Lavrov visited Warsaw twice. In the same year, Polish and Russian Vice-Premiers Waldemar Pawliak and Igor Sechin signed an agreement to supply Russian gas to Poland. That was soon followed by the Russian president visiting Warsaw after a 9-year break. President Dmitry Medvedev then declared that relations between the two countries were obviously getting warmer.

We have recently heard nothing of the kind from the hosts of the Kremlin about relations between Lithuania and Russia. Why is Mr Haszczynski trying to find a warmer peace between Vilnius and Moscow when the Russian president has spoken openly about a warm peace between Warsaw and Moscow? Maybe the author of the article in Rzeczpospolita simply got confused?

Mr Haszczynski is right to worry about Moscow’s efforts to expand its influence in the region in the face of the difficulties the EU is undergoing. In his view, the disagreements between Vilnius and Warsaw open way to that: ‘For many years the big brother has been trying to interfere in this ceaseless conflict of younger and older brothers’.

According to Mr Haszczynski, if the crisis-stricken EU gets weaker and thus less attractive to Lithuania, which is on its periphery, the prospect of collaborating with a strong Russia might look like a good alternative. ‘Distancing itself from its older brother increases the likelihood of such a scenario. It is not too late for us to perceive that in both Vilnius and Warsaw’, Mr Haszczynski writes.

We might disagree with the ‘older and younger brother’ rhetoric, but that is trivial. What is much more noteworthy is Mr Haszczynski’s opinion about who is to blame for the row between the ‘older and younger brothers’. He claims Lithuania is to blame because it adopts laws that are supposedly unfriendly to its minorities, and it is supposedly deceiving Warsaw and breaking its promises about the rights of the Polish minority.

If the author of the article really cared about the Lithuanian-Polish relationship in the context of Russian influence, he would seek in his evaluation of the disagreements between Vilnius and Warsaw to discern the mistakes on both sides and recognise that Warsaw is also partly to blame. But Mr Haszczynski is unmoved by Lithuania’s arguments. He does not make the presumption that the position of Vilnius might be at least partially true. He does not even try to look objective. He believes and he argues that Warsaw is being deceived, that the Polish minority is being abused, and that Vilnius is being stubborn.

Let us not be as categorical as Mr Haszczynski. Let us make the presumption, or at least allow for such a presumption to exist, that roughly equal responsibility exists for the disagreements between Warsaw and Vilnius. Although to me as a polonophile and sympathiser with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, it seems that in this situation the position of Warsaw transgresses the limits of decency and a sound mind.

Nonetheless, let us go back to the main theme of Mr Haszczynski’s article, i.e. the relationship of Lithuanian Poles with the ‘big brother’. How are we to evaluate Waldemar Tomaszewski and the Electoral Action of Poles of Lithuania under his tight control?

Mr Tomaszewski has already declared that the EAPL and the Alliance of Russians will form a joint bloc in the forthcoming Seimas elections. During municipal elections in the city of Vilnius, the parties of the Polish and Russian minorities already participated together. Mr Tomaszewski found no fault in collaborating with politicians who openly exalt the Kremlin. Among the EAPL candidates, there was even a former Soviet KGB officer who was elected to the municipal council.

A question arises for Mr Haszczynski: whose policy is pro-Russian? Is it Lithuania’s, or the EAPL’s, which works in alliance with former Soviet KGB officials and thus with the Alliance of Russians jointly collects the votes of the Polish minority and the votes of those who sympathise with intelligence organisations?

Last year the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia published a report on the condition of human rights in some countries around the world, including Lithuania. In Lithuania, ethnic minorities are discriminated against, the report states. That is the Polish accusation word for word. I wonder who of the two is the copycat here?

The report says, among other things, that Lithuania’s historic claims against Russia are not limited to the Soviet period and that the topic of the 1831 uprising against ‘tsarism’ is also actively debated. In this respect the ends fail to meet completely: the Poles try to argue that Lithuania is pro-Russian, while Russia’s Foreign Ministry claims that it is pro-Polish.

Political scientist Nerijus Maliukevičius argues that the report of the Russian Foreign Ministry is an attempt to use the so-called ‘Polish card’. Since there are few citizens of Russian origin in Lithuania, Russia pursues its foreign policy goals by using the Polish minority.

Why does Mr Haszczynski discern a warm peace between Lithuania and Russia when Russia so openly demonstrates hostility towards Vilnius and its agreement with Warsaw on the issue of the Polish minority in Lithuania? Does he not see, or rather does he not want to see who benefits from Mr Tomaszewski’s policies and with whom this figure has joined ranks?

Mr Haszczynski contradicts himself. On the one hand, in a supposedly friendly manner, he warns Lithuania about Russian influence, but on the other hand he, together with the Polish government, vehemently strives to protect the agents of this influence. Perhaps he should heed the words of Mahir Gamzajev, the chairman of the Council of National Minorities of Lithuania who recently said this: ‘The alliance of some Russian and Polish forces did not come into being recently. ... The scenarios and ideological guidelines are being agreed upon not only in Lithuania, but also outside its borders. We see that. .... For several years we have been the hostages of policies pursued by the EAPL. Because of their destructive activities and because of their unreasonable claims and steps, the law on national minorities has not been adopted yet. There are not even any laws contributing to the integration of various peoples by safeguarding their national identities and culture. We regret that the respective Lithuanian institutions are acting unreasonably liberal. Even dangerously soft, I would add’.